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In this work we study a model of tax evasion. We considered a fixed population divided
in three compartments, namely honest tax payers, tax evaders and a third class be-
tween the mentioned two, which we call susceptibles to become evaders. The transitions
among those compartments are ruled by probabilities, similarly to a model of epidemic
spreading. These probabilities model social interactions among the individuals, as well
as the government’s fiscalization. We simulate the model on fully-connected graphs, as
well as on scale-free and random complex networks. For the fully-connected and random
graph cases we observe that the emergence of tax evaders in the population is associated
with an active-absorbing nonequilibrium phase transition, that is absent in scale-free
networks.
Keywords: Dynamics of social systems, Econophysics, Computer simulations, Complex
Networks
PACS Nos.: 05.10.-a, 05.70.Jk, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
1. Introduction
Socio-economic problems have been the targets of several studies in last years
1,2. Those interdisciplinary topics are usually treated by means of computer simula-
tions of agent-based models, which allow us to understand the emergence of collec-
tive phenomena in those systems. Among the studied problems, one of great interest
is tax evasion dynamics, which is interesting from the practical point of view because
tax evasion remains to be a major predicament facing governments 3,4,5. Economists
studied models of tax evasion during several years 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, and more re-
cently physicists also became interested in the subject 14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21 (for
recent reviews, see 3,4). Experimental evidence provided by Gachter suggests that
tax payers tend to condition their decision regarding whether to pay taxes or not on
the tax evasion decision of the members of their group 6. In addition, Frey and Tor-
gler also provide empirical evidence on the relevance of conditional cooperation for
tax morale 7. Taking those discussions into account, Zaklan et al. recently proposed
a model that has been attracted attention 14. In the so-called Zaklan model, the
dynamics of tax payers and tax evaders is analyzed by means of the two-dimensional
1
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Ising model at a given temperature T . Each agent i in the artificial population may
be in one of two possible states, namely si = +1 (honest) or si = −1 (cheater or tax
evader). A transition si → −si (or a spin flip) is controlled by the “social temper-
ature” T and also depends on the nearest neighbors’ states of the agent (or spin)
at site i. Thus, for low temperatures few spin flips occur and for high temperatures
many spin flips occur. In other words, tax evaders have the greatest influence to
turn honest citizens into tax evaders if they constitute a majority in the respective
neighborhood. In addition, some punishment rules are applied: there is a probabil-
ity pa of an audit each agent is subject to in every period and a length of time k
detected tax evaders remain honest 14. In another work, the dynamics of the model
was also controlled by another two-state model, namely the majority-vote model
with noise 22, where the noise q plays the role of the temperature. In this case,
similar results were found 17, suggesting that the results of the Zaklan model are
robust.
An interesting extension of such models is to consider that the transition from
honest to evader is not abrupt. In this case, it can be considered a third state that
can be called susceptible of undecided 10,21. The presence of such class was analyzed
taking into account the dynamics of kinetic exchange opinion models 21,23,24,25,
and considering the same punishment rules of the Zaklan model. In this case, it
was discussed 21 that the presence of such third class affects substantially the
dynamics, and that the compliance is high below the critical point (of the order-
disorder transition) of the opinion dynamics governed by the kinetic exchanges. On
the other hand, above the critical point the tax evasion can be considerably reduced
by the enforcement mechanism.
In this work we propose another three-state agent-based model to analyze tax
evasion dynamics. The transitions among the classes are ruled by probabilities, sim-
ilarly to what happens in models of epidemic spreading 26,27,28. The enforcement
mechanism is considering in the mentioned probabilities, as well as the social pres-
sure of the contacts of a given individual. We will also see that the emergence of tax
evaders in the population can be associated with a nonequilibrium phase transition,
that was not observed in previous physics models of tax evasion, to the best of our
knowledge 14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21.
This work is organized as follows. In section 2 we define the model’s rules and the
individuals presented in the population. After, we discuss results in three distinct
topologies. Finally, in section 3 we present our conclusions and final remarks.
2. Model and Results
We considered a population of N agents defined in a given network of contacts,
that will be defined specifically in the following. Each individual i (i = 1, 2, ..., N)
can be in one of three possible states or attitudes at a given time step t, represented
by X1(t), X2(t) and X3(t). In other words, Xj represents the number of individuals
in a given state, with j = 1, 2, 3. The state X1 represents a honest tax payer, i.e.,
September 15, 2016 0:29 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
paper˙v2˙Brum˙Crokidakis
Dynamics of tax evasion through an epidemic-like model 3
an individual 100% convinced of his/her honesty, who does not consider evasion.
He/she is either habitually compliant or he/she is a recent evader who has become
honest as a result of enforcement efforts or social norms. On the other hand, the state
X3 represents a cheater, i.e, an individual who is an evading tax payer. Whether a
tax payer continues to evade depends on both enforcement and the effect of social
interactions. Finally, the third state X2 consists of taxpayers who are dissatisfied
with the tax system (perhaps as a result of seeing others evade without being
punished). These taxpayers are not actively evading, but they might if the perceived
benefits of doing so exceed the perceived costs. For this group, evasion is an option,
and so we classify them as susceptibles 10, i.e., they are susceptible to become
evaders.
We consider here two distinct mechanisms to govern the transitions among the
above-mentioned classesX1, X2 andX3: social interactions and enforcement regime.
The possible transitions are as follows:
X1 +X3
λ
→ X2 +X3 , (1)
X2
α
→ X3 , (2)
X3 +X1
δ
→ X1 +X1 , (3)
X3
β
→ X1 . (4)
The interpretation of these transitions is as follows. Eq. (1) represents an en-
counter of a honest agent X1 with an evader X3. In this case, with probability λ
the honest individual becomes susceptible X2. The parameter λ can be viewed as
the persuasion power of the evaders. The following transition, Eq. (2) represents a
spontaneous transition from the susceptible state X2 to the evader state X3. The
enforcement affects the behavior of a susceptible individual through its effect on
the perceived costs of evasion (cost-benefit analysis). Thus, we assume that some
susceptible tax payers will perceive that the benefits of evasion exceed the costs of
evasion in each period, leading these individuals to evade. This is represented by the
probability α. In this case, we consider that the transition from honest to evader
is not abrupt: the individual first becomes susceptible and after he might become
evader.
Eq. (3) represents the opposite transition in comparison with Eq. (1). In this
case, it represents an encounter of an evader agentX3 with a honest tax payerX1. In
this case, with probability δ the evader individual becomes honest. The parameter
δ can be viewed as the persuasion power of the honests. One can also consider that
this last transition occurs to the state X2, but for simplicity we consider that the
evaders go directly to the honest compartment.
Finnaly, Eq. (4) represents another enforcement effect. We consider that evaders
become compliant after they are audited or when their perceptions regarding the
costs and benefits of evasion change, either through experience or changing economic
conditions 10. This transition occurs with probability β, that can be viewed as a
measure of the efficiency of the government’s fiscalization. As in the previous case,
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one can also consider that some evaders might not be rehabilitated when they are
audited, remaining susceptible rather than becoming honest, but for simplicity we
will not consider those additional transitions.
In the following subsections we consider the model defined in Eqs. (1) - (4) on
the top of three distinct topologies: fully-connected network, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
graph and scale-free Baraba´si-Albert network.
2.1. Fully-connected network
In this section we consider the model on a fully-connected graph. Considering
the densities of each state, namely xj = Xj/N (j = 1, 2, 3), the above Eqs. (1) - (4)
can be translated on the mean-field equations
d
dt
x1 = β x3 − λx1 x3 + δ x1 x3 , (5)
d
dt
x2 = −αx2 + λx1 x3 , (6)
d
dt
x3 = αx2 − β x3 − δ x1 x3 . (7)
where now x1, x2 and x3 denote the fractions of honest, susceptible and tax evader
individuals, respectively.
One can start analyzing the time evolution of the three classes of individuals.
We numerically integrated Eqs. (5), (6) and (7) in order to analyze the effects
of the variation of the model’s parameters. As initial conditions, we considered
x1(0) = 0.98, x2(0) = 0.02 and x3(0) = 0, and for simplicity we fixed α = 0.2 and
δ = 0.3, varying the parameters λ and β. In Fig. 1 we exhibit results for fixed β = 0.2
and typical values of λ (left panels) and for fixed λ = 0.8 and typical values of β
(right panels). For the cases with fixed β, one can see that the increase of λ causes
the decrease of x1 and the increase of x2 and x3. Remembering that λ models the
persuasion of evaders x3 in the social interactions with honests x1, i.e. the transition
given by eq. (1), it is easier to understand those results: for increasing values of λ
more agents goes from the class x1 to the class x2, and these susceptible individuals
after can go to the evader class x3, which cause an increse of the susceptible and
evader classes, and the decrease of honests.
On the other hand, in the graphics with fixed λ, one can see that the increase
of β leads to an increase of honests and a decrease of susceptibles and evaders.
This is compatible with the interpretation of β as a government fiscalization: the
increase of the efficiency of the enforcement regime leads to the rise of honesty in
the population, as well as the decrease of tax evasion. Thus, the variation of those
two parameters β and λ models the competition of pressure of the social contacts
and the State’s fiscalization.
One can observe in Fig. 1 that the fractions x1, x2 and x3 evolve with time and
after some steps they stabilize. One can derive analytically the stationary fractions of
the three classes by taking the time derivatives equal to zero in Eqs. (5), (6) and (7).
September 15, 2016 0:29 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
paper˙v2˙Brum˙Crokidakis
Dynamics of tax evasion through an epidemic-like model 5
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
x 1
time
Mean Field - α=0.2, δ=0.3, β=0.2
λ=0.6
λ=0.7
λ=0.8
λ=0.9
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
x 1
time
Mean Field - α=0.2, δ=0.3, λ=0.8
β=0.1
β=0.2
β=0.3
β=0.4
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
x 2
time
Mean Field - α=0.2, δ=0.3, β=0.2
λ=0.6
λ=0.7
λ=0.8
λ=0.9
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0.45
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
x 2
time
Mean Field - α=0.2, δ=0.3, λ=0.8
β=0.1
β=0.2
β=0.3
β=0.4
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
x 3
time
Mean Field - α=0.2, δ=0.3, β=0.2
λ=0.6
λ=0.7
λ=0.8
λ=0.9
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 0.45
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
x 3
time
Mean Field - α=0.2, δ=0.3, λ=0.8
β=0.1
β=0.2
β=0.3
β=0.4
Fig. 1. (Color online) Time evolution of the three densities of agents x1, x2 and x3 for the mean-
field formulation of the model, based on Eqs. (5) - (7). The fixed parameters are α = 0.2 and
δ = 0.3. In the left panels it is shown the evolution for β = 0.2 and typical values of λ, whereas in
the right panels we exhibit the evolution for λ = 0.8 and typical values of β.
In this case, one can obtain the fixed points as functions of the models’parameters,
x∗
1
=
β
λ− δ
, (8)
x∗2 =
λβ (λ− δ − β)
(λ− δ) [λβ + α (λ− δ)]
, (9)
x∗
3
=
λ− δ − β
λ− δ + (λ/α)β
. (10)
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Fig. 2. (Color online) Stationary fractions x∗
1
(upper left), x∗
2
(upper right) and x∗
3
(lower) of the
three classes of agents for the mean-field formulation of the model, given by Eqs. (8) - (10). The
fractions are plotted as a function of λ for typical values of β. The fixed parameters are α = 0.2
and δ = 0.3.
One can see from the above equations that the model undergoes a nonequilibrium
phase transition if we consider the stationary fraction of evaders x∗3 as an order
parameter: for λ ≤ λc the stationary solutions are given by x
∗
1
= 1 and x∗
2
= x∗
3
= 0,
whereas for λ > λc the solutions give us x
∗
1
> 0, x∗
2
> 0 and x∗
3
> 0, where the
threshold is given by λc = β + δ. This is an active-absorbing transition
29,30, and
it separates a phase where the tax evaders disappear of the population in the long-
time limit and the population is formed only by honests, from a phase where there
is a finite fraction of evaders in the long time. The susceptible agents also survive
in the active phase, and they disappear in the absorbing phase.
For a better analysis of the stationary behavior, we show in Fig. 2 the stationary
fractions x∗1, x
∗
2 and x
∗
3 as functions of λ for typical values of β. The results are based
on Eqs. (8) - (10). One can see the mentioned phase transition in the lower panel: for
values λ ≤ λc = β + δ we have x
∗
3 = 0, and for λ > λc we have x
∗
3 > 0. In addition,
one can see again the behaviors discussed above, i.e., the decrease of the evasion for
increasing fiscalization (β) and the decrease of honests due to social pressure of tax
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evaders (λ), that are realistic features of the model. Comparing the three values of
β in the lower panel of Fig. 2, we see that the enforcement regime can be extremely
effective for control the evasion. Indeed, this effect can be seen in Eqs. (8) - (10):
for increasing β we see that x∗3 decreases, and x
∗
1 increases.
2.2. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random graph
In this section we consider the model on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs. The
network is formed by N isolated nodes, and we connect each pair with probability
p. In this case, we performed simulations considering the rules given by Eqs. (1)-(4)
for network size N = 104 and the connection probability p = 5× 10−4, which gives
us an average connectivity 〈k〉 = 5.
The numerical procedure is as follows. We visit every node in the ER graph and
apply the rules (1)-(4). In the case where the chosen node is in the X1 state, for
example, we apply the rule (1) if he/she has at least one neighbor in the X3 state.
The same occurs for the social interaction given by Eq. (3). The remaining rules (2)
and (4) are spontaneous transitions.
As in the previous subsection, one can start analyzing the time evolution of
the three classes of individuals. We considered the same initial conditions as before,
namely x1(0) = 0.98, x2(0) = 0.02 and x3(0) = 0, and for simplicity we fixed α = 0.2
and δ = 0.3, varying the parameters λ and β. In Fig. 3 we exhibit results for fixed
β = 0.2 and typical values of λ (left panels) and for fixed λ = 0.8 and typical values
of β (right panels). One can see a qualitative similar behavior observed in the fully-
connected graph, i.e., for the cases with fixed β, one can see that the increase of λ
leads to the decrease of x1 and the increase of x2 and x3, since λ is related to the
social pressure of tax evaders over honest individuals. In addition, for the graphics
with fixed λ, the increase of the fiscalization β leads to an increase of honests and
a decrease of susceptibles and evaders.
However, the stationary values are different from the previous cases, as well as
the impact of fiscalization and social pressure. In order to better see these differ-
ences, we exhibit in Fig. 4 the stationary values x∗
1
, x∗
2
and x∗
3
as functions of λ
for typical values of the fiscalization β. Comparing the three graphics, one can see
that the fiscalization can reduce the fraction of tax evaders in the population, even
if the social pressure λ of dishonest individuals over honest ones is high: if β is in-
creased from 0.1 to 0.5 the stationary fraction of evaders in the population reduces
from ≈ 0.4 to ≈ 0.2 for λ = 1.0. However, in comparison with the mean-field case,
the reduction of evasion is smaller. Thus, considering a more realistic topology, the
pressure of the social contacts in the network leads to a slow decrease of the honest
tax payers in comparison with the fully-connected graph. This occurs since a given
agent in the ER random graph is always connected with the same neighbors (av-
erage value 〈k〉), and in the fully-connected case each agent can interact with all
others.
Furthermore, one can see a large density of susceptibles in comparison with
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Time evolution of the three densities of agents x1, x2 and x3 obtained from
simulations of the model defined on the ER Random Graph. The fixed parameters are α = 0.2 and
δ = 0.3. In the left panels it is shown the evolution for β = 0.2 and typical values of λ, whereas in
the right panels we exhibit the evolution for λ = 0.8 and typical values of β.
the fully-connected graph. One can also see the above-mentioned active-absorbing
phase transition, but the threshold values are very small in comparison with the
mean-field case. All these differences appear as consequences of the presence of a
more realistic topology for modelling the society.
September 15, 2016 0:29 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
paper˙v2˙Brum˙Crokidakis
Dynamics of tax evasion through an epidemic-like model 9
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
St
at
io
na
ry
 d
en
sit
ie
s
λ
ER Network - N=104, α=0.2, δ=0.3,β=0.1 , p=5.10-4
x*1
x*2
x*3
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
St
at
io
na
ry
 d
en
sit
ie
s
λ
ER Network - N=104, α=0.2, δ=0.3,β=0.3 , p=5.10-4
x*1
x*2
x*3
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
St
at
io
na
ry
 d
en
sit
ie
s
λ
ER Network - N=104, α=0.2, δ=0.3,β=0.5 , p=5.10-4
x*1
x*2
x*3
Fig. 4. (Color online) Stationary fractions x∗
1
, x∗
2
and x∗
3
as functions of λ for β = 0.1 (upper
left), β = 0.3 (upper right) and β = 0.5 (lower) for the model simulated on the ER graph. The
fixed parameters are α = 0.2 and δ = 0.3.
2.3. Baraba´si-Albert network
Finally, in this section we consider the model on Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-
free networks. In this case, we performed simulations considering the rules given
by Eqs. (1)-(4) for network size N = 104. Each generated network starts with 2
nodes connected between themselves, and at each time step we add 1 node and 1
link to a pre-existing node, considering the usual preferential attachment procedure
(probability proportional to the connectivity). The numerical procedure is the same
described for the ER graph: we visit every node in the BA network and apply the
rules (1)-(4). In the case where the chosen node is in the X1 state, for example, we
apply the rule (1) if he/she has at least one neighbor in the X3 state. The same
occurs for the social interaction given by Eq. (3). The remaining rules (2) and (4)
are spontaneous transitions.
The time evolution of the densities is very similar to the previous cases, as it is
shown in Fig. 5. In addition, the stationary values x∗1, x
∗
2 and x
∗
3 are exhibited in
Fig. 6. In comparison with the previous cases, the decrease of the fraction of honests
is slower when we rise the probability λ. We also see a similar behavior related to
the increase of the enforcement β, with a good reduction of tax evasion, and a rapid
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Fig. 5. (Color online) Time evolution of the three densities of agents x1, x2 and x3 obtained
from simulations of the model defined on the BA scale-free networks. The fixed parameters are
α = 0.2 and δ = 0.3. In the left panels it is shown the evolution for β = 0.2 and typical values of
λ, whereas in the right panels we exhibit the evolution for λ = 0.8 and typical values of β.
increase of the susceptible agents for increasing values of λ.
As in the other graphs, one can see that we have x∗3 = 0 for sufficient small values
of λ. However, as it is typical in epidemic-like models in scale-free BA networks,
this is only a finite size effect, and we do not expect an “epidemic threshold” in this
case 28. As an evidence of this fact, we plot in Fig. 7 the thresholds λc(N) obtained
from simulations as functions of the inverse networks size N−1. As one can see in
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Fig. 6. (Color online) Stationary fractions x∗
1
, x∗
2
and x∗
3
as functions of λ for β = 0.1 (upper
left), β = 0.3 (upper right) and β = 0.5 (lower) for the model simulated on the BA network. The
fixed parameters are α = 0.2 and δ = 0.3.
the left panel of Fig. 7, for the ER random graph λc(N) tends to stabilize at a
finite value for increasing values of N , suggesting a nonzero threshold. On the other
hand, for the BA network the threshold λc(N) decays as a power law for increasing
sizes, signaling the absence of the “epidemic threshold” in the thermodynamic limit
N−1 → 0 (see the right panel of Fig. 7) 28. In this case, for a sufficient large
network, one expect the presence of noncompliant individuals (tax evaders) in the
population in the long-time limit, for any value of λ > 0.
Comparing the results for the two complex topologies (ER and BA), one can
see that a given variation of λ (social parameter) leads to distinct variations of the
fraction of tax evaders (see Figs. 3 - 6). This effect can be related to the presence of
hubs (highly connected nodes) in the BA network, as well as the large fluctuation in
the average connectivity. These characteristics are absent in the ER random graph,
and are crucial for the spreading of influence in the population.
3. Concluding remarks
In this work, we have studied the dynamics of tax evasion through an epidemic-
like model. We considered three compartments, namely honest tax payers, tax
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Fig. 7. (Color online) Thresholds λc(N) as functions of the inverse network size N−1 for the ER
random graph (left) and BA network (right). The fixed parameters are α = 0.2 and δ = 0.3, and
the results are for β = 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. The straight line in panel (b) indicates a power-law decay
on λc(N), signaling the absence of the “epidemic threshold” in the thermodynamic limit.
evaders and susceptibles, individuals that are in a intermediate class among honests
and dishonests. The transitions among these classes are ruled by four distinct prob-
abilities, that represent social interactions and the enforcement regime. We study
the dynamics of the system on the top of three distinct topologies: fully-connected
graph, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network.
For the fully-connected graph, one derive mean-field equations that allow us to
analyze in details the dynamics and the steady-state properties of the model. Some
realistic behaviors were observed, as the reduction of the evasion due to enforcement
regime, as well as the increse of honesty. We also observed that the emergence of
evaders in the population is associated with a nonequilibrium phase transition:
for small values of the control parameter there are only honest tax payers in the
population, and above the critical point the three classes (honests, susceptibles and
evaders) coexist in the system. The results are qualitatively similar for the other
topologies, but regarding the stationary values of the densities of individuals, we
verified that the control of tax evasion is harder if the model is simulated on the top
of complex networks. In this case, we also verified that the effect of social pressure
is more pronounced in comparison with the mean-field case.
We observed that in the mean-field case the tax evasion (fraction of noncompliant
agents) is absent (x∗
3
= 0) even for high social pressure (high λ), which can be
seen as a limitation of the model in the simple case of a fully-connected topology.
However, this unrealistic feature disappears when we considered the model on the
top of complex networks. Indeed, for the ER random graph the region where the
tax evaders disappear of the population in the steady states is given by a narrow
range of values of λ, even if the government’s fiscalization is high. On the other
hand, in the BA scale-free network this effect is more pronounced, and for sufficient
large networks the evasion is always present in the population, even for strong
fiscalization.
September 15, 2016 0:29 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
paper˙v2˙Brum˙Crokidakis
Dynamics of tax evasion through an epidemic-like model 13
Some qualitative comparison with real data can be done. Some authors estimated
the tax evasion in Brazil in the range 15 − 22%, or even higher values (see 31 and
references therein). This range of evasion can be verified in our results for small
values of β, i.e., for weak fiscalization and/or light punishment, as occurs in Brazil
32,33. For example, in Fig. 2 the fraction of evasion in the range 15− 22% can be
observed for β = 0.1, considering the range ≈ 0.45 < λ < 0.5 (mean field). For
the networks, one can see the mentioned range of evasion for ≈ 0.15 < λ < 0.4
(β = 0.1) and ≈ 0.2 < λ < 0.7 (β = 0.3), for the ER network (see Fig. 4). For the
BA network, ≈ 0.25 < λ < 0.4 (β = 0.1) and ≈ 0.5 < λ < 1.0 (β = 0.3) (see Fig.
6).
The phase transition observed in the mean-field formulation of the model is an
active-absorbing phase transition, and the predicted exponent for the order param-
eter is 1 (x∗
3
∼ (λ − λc)
1) as in the mean-field directed percolation, that is the
prototype of a phase transition to an absorbing state 29,30. It would be interesting
to estimate numerically other critical exponents of the model, as well as to simulate
it in regular d-dimensional lattices (square, cubic, for example) in order to obtain
all the critical exponents. This is important to define precisely the universality class
of the model, as well as its upper critical dimension. This extension is left for a
future work. Furthermore, it can also be considered the inclusion of heterogeneities
in the population, like agents’ conviction, mass media effects, etc.
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